This is the second of four posts on how Iran's foreign policy actually developed over the last hundred years, and how the attacks of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror transformed it completely.

The Cold War and the Coup

The catalyst for Iran’s new international significance, somewhat unexpectedly, was the failure of the Nationalisation Law which had been a condition of the appointment of Mohammad Mossadeq as Prime Minister in 1951.

The Iranian Majlis’ decision to nationalise the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), triggering a western sponsored coup marks the moment at which power transitioned from Britain to America. And whilst that moment centred on the failure of a strategy intended to free Iran’s most important national asset from Imperial control, it would see Iran finally take its place on the International – and especially regional – stage, this time as a critical contributor to US national interests.

What lay behind this was the fast-developing cold war and the struggle between the Soviet Union and the West for control of the developing world, in which the Middle East featured prominently. President Harry S Truman’s ‘Point Four Programme’ for the provision of technical assistance to developing countries to improve standards of living was intended to demonstrate the benefits of democracy and capitalism over communism. Critics saw it as a new form of imperialism. Mohammad Reza Shah saw it as a golden opportunity for his country.

The relationship was transactional. The Shah saw his survival as inextricably linked to the loyalty of the Iranian Army. Securing his objective seemed simply a matter of enthusiastically joining the US in its fight against communism which would secure both the necessary military funding and thus the Shah’s reign by rendering Iran a critical element of the US’ containment policy. Iran’s decision to enter the 1955 Baghdad Pact – the origins of the Central Treaty Organisation – publicly cemented his intent.

Thus, with the benefit of some $500m in US aid received by 19637 the army grew rapidly and with it the Shah’s confidence. In 1959 the Iraqi revolution and President Nasser’s pan Arabist movement emphasised the risks that Arab nationalism presented to stability in the Middle East, providing the Soviet Union with opportunities for expanding its influence. With an eye to currying favour in the US, the Shah made countering this the focus of his foreign policy. The Iranian National Intelligence and Security organisation (SAVAK) was established8 to this end and Lebanon with its population of Shi’a was selected as the battlefield on which to counter the threat. The Shah’s investment in this region led to a new sense of unity and confidence amongst the southern Lebanese Shi’a which marked the foundation stone of Hizballah but by 1971 and Britain’s withdrawal of its forces from east of Suez the Shah was ready to seize the opportunity to dominate the regional stage. With President Nixon’s support Iran would take on the role of “Policeman of the Gulf”.

From ‘Gendarme of the Gulf’ to US Public enemy no.1

Having achieved the status of critical US ally, the Shah’s activities thereafter demonstrated the confidence of an ascendant ruler. Culminating in the Algiers Accord of 1975 in which the Middle East’s latest strong man, Saddam Hussein, was humbled into losing control of the Shatt al Arab waterway which divided the two countries. By the time of the next great hiatus in Iranian history, Iran was unarguably the most powerful Middle Eastern nation.

The Islamic revolution then, rather upset the apple cart.

Khomeini’s approval of the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran terminated US support for Iran and the new Islamic regime, with the confidence of successful revolutionary leaders whose inheritance was the region’s biggest army, embarked on a bold new foreign policy. Its intent was the overthrow of the imperial order of the deposed Shah, replacing it with an Islamic Umma transcending national boundaries which, since Iran was the only country in which the “Government of God” had been established, would be governed by the regime.9

The ensuing war with neighbour Iraq was unnecessarily protracted, extremely painful and left this foreign policy in tatters. The Middle Eastern order survived and the wider Muslim community comprehensively rejected Khomeini’s Umma. Henceforth the regime’s aggressively expansionist foreign policy would be comprehensively watered down, from “permanent revolution” to “Islam in one country” as once more Iran was forced to turn its attentions inwards to focus on the desperate need for recovery,.

Between 1989-1997, therefore, President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani adopted a highly pragmatic approach to foreign policy, based on the urgent need to reconstruct Iran. Diplomatic relations were rapidly re-established, ideology slipped from the top of the list of policy priorities and Iran declared it would respect international rules and institutions.

Rafsanjani’s successor, Muhammad Khatami rested his political strategy on the need for external investment. Khatami understood that this depended on stability, both domestically and internationally and pursued a more narrowly reformist agenda which included the development of civil society, the rule of law and political pluralism and freedom of speech.10 At the same time, on the international arena, Khatami sought to reject the “imperious confrontations of old”11 and to rebuild Iran’s relationships based on mutual respect and trust.

Khatami communicated this intent in the international media, in December 1997 expressing an open desire to improve relations:

“I…pay my respect to the great people and nation of America. I hope to be able, in the not-too-distant future, to speak particularly with the people of America and about America.”12

President Clinton responded warmly, “I’d like nothing better than to have a dialogue with Iran”.13 Two months later his tone was warmer still: “One of the best things we could do for the long term peace and health of the Middle East and indeed, much of the rest of the world, is to have a constructive partnership with Iran.”14

In September 1998 at the United Nations General Assembly, Khatami proposed a “Dialogue between civilisations”, at once reflecting the grandeur of Iranian aspirations and communicating a willingness to move beyond past antagonisms. European and US responses were dismissive but the proposal was well received at the United Nations, who designated 2001 the year of the dialogue among civilisations. The future for relations between Iran and the west was starting to look promising. Until, that is, the arrival of President George W Bush in January 2001 and the horror of 911.

The impact of 911 and the ‘War on Terror’

Al Qaeda’s attacks of September 2001 at a stroke destroyed Khatami’s international progress.

The attacks themselves inspired much the same sense of horror amongst Iranians as they did elsewhere. Khatami was quick to convey his sympathies and his condemnation of the attackers. His sympathy extended to the thousands who joined candle-lit vigils and to the 60,000 spectators who observed a minute’s silence at Tehran’s Azadi Stadium. Khatami’s government, sensing an opportunity in the US attack on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, offered the use of its territory for search and rescue missions in Afghanistan.

Barbara Slavin states that the Iranian regime also worked openly with the US to topple the Taliban and stabilise the new government – and imposed pressure on the Afghan Northern Alliance to permit Hamid Karzai to become President. There was even a cautious willingness to join the US led anti-terror campaign.15 Indeed it was while back-channel talks were being conducted with Iran regarding the pursuit of Al Qaeda fighters fleeing into Iran that President Bush delivered his now notorious State of the Union address.

Bush’s speech included Iran with Iraq and North Korea as terrorism sponsors within the so-called Axis of Evil and must have come as a huge disappointment to the Iranian leadership, marking the end of its efforts to develop meaningful relations with the west. Khatami was struggling with internal hardliners and the collapse of a central plank of his foreign policy did him no favours. It undoubtedly contributed to a subsequent hardening of his approach to the west and to another sea change in Iranian foreign policy. This time featuring a new approach combining efforts to foment regional instability with a new focus on a nuclear programme designed to force the west to take Iran seriously on the global stage. Arguably, both have proved remarkably successful.

Bibliography

Samii, Abbas William. "The Shah's Lebanon Policy: The Role of SAVAK." Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 33, no. 1, Jan. 1997, pp. 66–91, https://doi.org/10.1080/00263209708701142. Accessed 31 Aug. 2021.

Arash Reisinezhad. The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia. 2019.

Green, Jerrold, et al. Understanding Iran. Santa Monica, Ca, Rand National Security Research Division, Cop, 2009.

Ansari, Ali. "Avoiding the Worst Case Scenario: Iran and the Real Possibilities of Engagement." Oslo Forum, 2007, file:///C:/Users/davie/OneDrive/Personal%20skydrive/St%20Andrews%20Masters%20degree/GWOT%20Iran%20tactics/ansari%20Avoidingtheworstcasescenario-Iranandtherealpossibilitiesofengagement-June-2007.pdf. Accessed Apr. 23AD.

Ghumman, kashif Mumtaz. Iran-US Relations in the Post 9/11 Days: Problems and Prospects. 2002, pp. 170–186, www.jstor.org/stable/45242315. Accessed 24 Apr. 2025.

Soltani, Fakhreddin, and Reza Ekhtiari Amiri. "Foreign Policy of Iran after Islamic Revolution." Journal of Politics and Law, vol. 3, no. 2, 2 Aug. 2010, https://doi.org/10.5539/jpl.v3n2p199. Accessed 3 Nov. 2019.

Karsh, Efraim. The Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988. Oxford, Osprey Publishing, 2002.

Razoux, Pierre. The Iran-Iraq War. Harvard University Press, 3 Nov. 2015.

Shahram Chubin. Iran and Iraq at War. Routledge, 1 Mar. 2019.

Barbara Slavin. The Atlantic Council. “The global war on terrorism wrecked relations with Iran”.